In this paper we describe a mathematical apparatus and software implementation of a module of the RiskPanel system, aimed to compare computer-security knowledge learned from various online sources.
INTRODUCTION
The main problem in designing intelligent systems is how to represent and process knowledge. Computer programs should have knowledge of a given subject domain presented in a formalism that is useful for the program. Knowledge representation consists mainly of identifying the most appropriate formalisms for representing knowledge and the most effective methods for manipulating this knowledge (Thayse, 1989) .
This problem is particularly acute for knowledge of information security and cyber threats. In these subject domains, the value of information depends much more on its novelty than in most other scientific and technological domains. To effectively protect against computer threats, they must be identified as early as possible. Text in natural language on the Internet is one of the most relevant sources of such information. This gives rise to the need of representing security knowledge as ontologies. There are many application of knowledge based systems to computer security (for example (Ruhroth et al., 2014) , (Gartner et al., 2014) , (Burger et al., 2013) ).
One method to process knowledge learned from text in natural language is model-theoretic knowledge representation, based on the modeltheoretic approach developed to formalize domain ontologies (Palchunov, 2008) and Case-based reasoning methodology (Kolodner, 1992) , (Assali et al., 2013) . Under this approach, the knowledge learned from texts written in natural language is presented as algebraic systems (domain cases) (Yakhyaeva and Yasinskaya, 2014) . Using these systems, a case-based model of the subject domain can be constructed. The truth value of a sentence in the case-based model is the set of cases for which the sentence is true in a strict sense. From the casebased model fuzzification we obtain a fuzzy model, in which the truth values of the sentences are numbers in the interval [0, 1] . By fuzzifying a set of case-based models, we obtain a generalized fuzzy model. A formal (model-theoretic) description of these models can be found in (Pulchunov and Yakhyaeva, 2005) and (Yakhyaeva, 2007) .
Knowledge-based systems are required to exploit knowledge from multiple sources to solve increasingly difficult problems. Therefore there is a need to establish a mechanism of knowledge integration. Many researchers in different subject domains are interested in that problem and consider it from different points of view. Haddad and Bozdogan (2009) provide definition for the knowledge integration phenomenon at both the conceptual and operational levels. Steier et al., (1993) implemented knowledge source integration mechanism in Soar architecture system. Console et al., (1991) analyzed integration of different knowledge sources in model-based diagnostic system. Semi-automatic integration of knowledge sources using semantic knowledge articulation tool (SKAT) was provided by Mitra et al., (1999) .
One way to generate new knowledge through texts in natural language by comparing and integrating knowledge from different texts (Pulchunov, 2009) . While extracting knowledge from natural language texts, different generalized fuzzy models are built. Accordingly, there is a need to compare the different algebraic systems.
This paper presents a model-theoretic description of comparing knowledge learned from different texts in natural language and an application of this theory in the subject domain of computer security.
MATHEMATICAL FOUNDATIONS OF THE DEVELOPED APPROACH

Case-based Models
First, we define a finite set of documents, each describing some case of computer attacks. We describe each case by algebraic system 〈 , 〉, where is the universe of the algebraic system and is its signature. Signature σ is a set of concepts that describe this subject domain: the set of vulnerabilities, threats, countermeasures, consequences, and so on. We assume that all these cases have the same signature. We denote set A and signature as ∪ | ∈ . Algebraic systems by which we describe instances of domain belong to the following class
Let ℘ denote the set of all subsets of X, and let denote the set of all sentences of the signature . The algebraic system , a model of some computer attack, will be called the case of the considered subject domain. For each set of cases we define a case-based model . The case-based model is a Boolean model in which the truth values of the sentences are the elements of Boolean algebra. In this case, the truth values of the sentences are the elements of Boolean algebra of all subsets of set .
Consider set to be the set of all kinds of computer attacks: those that have already occurred, and those that can still occur. At any one moment, our knowledge of cyber attacks that have already happened is finite. However, this knowledge is constantly growing, adding new cases. Thus, we can assume that set can be counted. It is sufficient to consider only the finite subsets of to formalize our knowledge about the domain at different times. Thus, we consider only finite sets of cases. Denote a class of all finite case-based models
Suppose we have a case-based model , a mathematical formalization of the knowledge base of computer-attack cases. To calculate the objective probabilities of different attacks occurring, we define the notion of the fuzzy model.
for any sentence of the signature .
We introduce the notation for class of all fuzzy models, generated by the models from class
In practice, one cannot have full information of a considered subject domain. For example, we cannot have information about all the cyber attacks and information-security violations that have occurred. Also, the documentation of particular attacks may be incomplete or inaccurate. It is impossible to give a complete description of the case-based model describing this subject domain, so we must consider fuzzy models that describe the properties of the subject domain that are already known. To formally describe this situation, we introduce the concept of the generalized fuzzy model. for any sentence of the signature .
Principle of Comparing the Generalized Fuzzy Models
One interpretation of the generalized fuzzy model is as follows: Suppose there is some expert in a subject domain described by the language . For example, this expert may be the system administrator of an enterprise, and the subject domain may be computer security. The expert must deal with a set of situations-the cases of that subject domain-for example, a set of cyber attacks. This set of cases can be considered as a probability space. The cases are the elementary outcomes of this probability space. Naturally, the expert does not know the full description of each case or the truth value of all sentences of signature for each case. Nevertheless, the expert can estimate the probabilities of the truth values of the sentences based on known information. For example, an expert can claim that 70% of computer attacks use denialof-service attacks or that not less than 60% of cyber attacks are done to steal information. Previous studies (Pulchunov and Yakhyaeva, 2010) have shown how such probabilistic expert knowledge can be formalized into a generalized fuzzy model. Now, suppose we have several experts in the subject domain. Each expert has unique knowledge of the subject domain, as they may get their knowledge from different sources and may have different training. When making a decision, we would like to account for the opinions of all the experts to find a compromise. This problem can be described in formal language as follows: Let the subject domain be described by a signature , where is the set of individuals (basic set) taken from the total set of individuals (basic set) in this subject domain. To describe the domain, we construct a finite number of generalized fuzzy models as Thus, it is more reasonable to formulate the principle of comparing n generalized fuzzy models as an n-ary function defined by the set of all generalized fuzzy models:
Moreover, it would be ideal for this comparison principle to work on any finite set of models and to not depend on the order the models are considered. These properties are achieved by using the properties of associativity and commutativity.
Product of the Generalized Fuzzy Models
First we define the operation of the product on the class of case-based models. 2) ∪ for any ∈ .
Definition 4. Let
Paper (Pulchunov and Yakhyaeva, 2010) proved that the operation * is associative, commutative, and closed in a set of case-based models.
Statement 5. Let * and , , . Then,
A proof of this statement can also be found in (Pulchunov and Yakhyaeva, 2010 Now we can define the operation of the product on a set of generalized fuzzy models.
Definition 7. Consider the generalized fuzzy models
. Let * * | ∈ , ∈ .
Then, the generalized fuzzy model * is called the product of models . Because the product of case-based models is commutative and associative, the product of the generalized fuzzy models will also be commutative and associative.
COMPUTER SECURITY SOFTWARE
Knowledge Base
We developed a software system called RiskPanel, essentially a workplace for experts to ensure the security of corporate information, based on the methodology of generalized fuzzy models (Pulchunov et al., 2011) . The core of this system is an informationsecurity knowledge base. To organize and work with the knowledge base, we use OntoBox technology (Malykh and Mantsivoda, 2010) . This system represents and stores data in an ontological format and has powerful, flexible processing tools. It allows for great modularity and portability of knowledge bases, advantageous when developing complex information systems.
Seven categories of attributes (classes) were created to describe the cases in the OntoBox knowledge base: symptoms, threats, vulnerabilities, consequences, loss, countermeasures, and configurations. Each attribute category was represented with a tree structure. The cases in the database are characterized by certain attributes of each category. Each case is formed based on naturallanguage text found on the Internet (Yakhyaeva and Yasinskaya, 2012) .
While analyzing the texts provided to form the cases, we found most of them had clear but not full information. In other words, we could not perfectly describe whether a particular case had specific knowledge-base attributes. To solve this problem, we proposed using an open-world semantic methodology, widely used in description logic systems (Baader, 2003 In this formalism, the entire knowledge base of RiskPanel can be considered a finite set of generalized cases. When drawing conclusions from this knowledge base, we must compare these models.
For a knowledge base formalized as a set of generalized cases, it is most appropriate to use a comparison principle based on the product of the generalized fuzzy models, because it is consistent with open-world semantics.
Note that each generalized case is not an interval model. Moreover, for each sentence ∈ , the truth value belongs to 0 , 1 , 0, 1 . Now, we must formulate an algorithm for calculating the truth values in a consistent model of generalized cases. Thus, we obtain ∈ ; ; … ; . Now consider ∈ ; ; … ; . Let .
Obviously, . Let
First, we select one case from each generalized case of set A, denoting them as ∈ 1, … , . Then we select cases ∈ 1, … , from the generalized cases of set B such that ⊨ . Last, we select cases ∈ 1, … , from the generalized cases of set B such that ⊭ .
Obviously, * … * * * … * ⊨ .
Thus, ∈ * … * . Note that comparing the finite set of generalized cases will not produce an interval model. But, when → ∞, the truth values of sentences in a consistent model will tend toward intervals on the set 0, … , 1 ∩ ℚ. Thus, in practice, when dealing with a large enough set of cases, we can view the truth values in a consistent model as intervals. Proof. Obviously,
Theorem of Atomically Generalized Cases
On the other hand,
Let , … , be a set of atomic propositions included in . Consider the set of elementary conjunctions
Assume now that , 0 and , 1 ∅. Thus, , 0, 1 ∅. Moreover, , 0, 1 ⊆ .
Consider two cases:
, 0, 1 and , 0, 1 . Let , 0, 1 . Then, for any case ∈ , there is a conjunct ∈ , 0, 1 such that ⊨ . Consequently, 1 for any case ∈ . Assume now that , 0, 1 ⊂ . Then there is a case ∈ such that ′ ⊭ for any ∈ , 0, 1 . Because we have assumed that , 1 ∅, then ′ ⊭ . On the other hand, because , 0, 1 ∅, there is a case such that ⊨ . Thus, 0, 1 .
Module of Knowledge Comparison
RiskPanel has a module for comparing knowledge learned from various computer-attack cases. Currently, the module interface allows one to calculate the truth value as an interval for a formula presented in PDNF (perfect disjunctive normal form). Consider the module interface (Fig. 1) . To input data into the main algorithm, the user must enter the parameters of the formula using the resources provided. First, the user must select the attributes included in all conjunctions of PDNF. Next, the user must specify the number of conjunctions in the formula. Then, drop-down lists of «+» and «-» values appear with the resulting PDNF, where «-» symbolizes negation of the argument. The data from this window with PDNF can be inputted into the main algorithm by clicking the button titled «Get the value of the formula».
The value of the formula is calculated as an interval (see Theorem 10). The start value of the interval is the ratio of the number of cases for which the formula is true to the number of all existing cases. The end value of the interval is the ratio of the number of cases for which the formula is true, added to the number of cases for which the truth value of the formula is not defined, to the number of all existing cases.
The algorithm used to determine the truth value of a formula in the generalized case is based on Theorem 12 and shown in Table 1 . At first, false conjunctions that contradict the available information for the case are eliminated from the formula. If no conjunctions in the formula remain, then the formula for the case is false. If the remaining conjunctions do not have unknown attribute values for the case, then the formula for the case is considered true. If the remaining conjunctions have unknown attribute values, then the algorithm operates as follows: If the number of remaining conjunctions is less than 2 , where is the number of unknown attribute values in the conjunction, then the truth value of the formula for the case is not defined, otherwise the formula is true.
To determine whether a case has attribute values included in the conjunctions requires operations, where is the number of attribute values in all categories stored in OntoBox. To eliminate false conjunctions for the case based on the information of attribute values requires operations, where is the number of conjunctions in PDNF. The total number of attribute values involved in the conjunctions cannot exceed . Thus, the total algorithmic complexity of the developed approach for defining the truth value of PDNF in a case is . Further, if the OntoBox knowledge base has m computer-attack cases, then calculating the truth value of the formula in interval form needs operations. we construct a generalized fuzzy model, the product of all algebraic systems stored in the database. The system interface allows one to calculate the truth value of any quantifier-free sentence. The input sentence is presented in PDNF. The truth value is calculated as a probability interval.
The developed algorithm has polynomial complexity.
